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Abstract     Inspired by theories of environmental criminology, this paper is concerned 
with the criminogenic potential of football matches. Do matches generate patterns of 
crime within grounds and beyond them? If so, over what period and over what distance 
are these effects produced? Police-recorded data for five football stadia for a six-year 
timeframe (2005 - 2010) are examined using non-parametric permutation tests. The 
spatial extent of any patterns are quantified and used to further examine differences in the 
temporal distribution of crime and incidents. Change in the spatial distribution of crime 
and incidents occurred around all five stadia and did so during those periods when the 
ambient population was elevated on match days. The results provide further support for 
theories of environmental criminology, suggesting that there is a higher risk of crime and 
incidents in the areas immediately around stadia during the hours that matches take place. 
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Introduction 
 
For nearly a century there has been an on-going debate over who should pay for the 
policing of football matches (Shortt, 1924). In the United Kingdom, football clubs have 
sought ways to minimise their contributions. In several instances they have refused 
payment or initiated litigation on the assumption that they had not requested additional 
policing services for football matches (Home Affairs Committee, 2009).  Indeed, most 
recently both the Greater Manchester Police and the West Yorkshire Police have been 
ensnarled in costly lawsuits concerning funding for policing matches at Wigan Athletic 
and Leeds United respectively (Home Affairs Committee, 2009; Leeds United Football 
Club v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police, 2014). Police forces have maintained 
that their role is to ensure public order and safety and therefore their services are 
required. Recent legal cases have revolved around who is financially responsible for 
policing areas surrounding grounds (Leeds United Football Club v Chief Constable of 
West Yorkshire Police, 2014).  
In the UK, presently the ‘footprint’, the area for which football clubs are held 
responsible for the costs of policing, encompasses the stadium and land in the vicinity of 
the stadium that is owned by the club and/or where the police presence is for the benefit 
of the club and the purposes of the match (Smith, 2010). The current method for 
determining the geography over which clubs are held to account for the costs of policing 
is not evidence-based: it has little to do with the area over which, or places where football 
matches influence the likelihood of crime occurrence.  The issue is, of course, 
contentious and the police believe that to maintain law and order, they must police an 
area larger than that suggested by numerous football clubs.  To date, legal proceedings 
have placed the onus upon the police, who have often failed to demonstrate in the courts 
that patterns in crimes recorded by the police are influenced by football matches, and 
instead have relied primarily on anecdotal evidence to describe neighbourhood policing 
problems that football matches bring about.  
This paper aims to assess the criminogenic effects of football matches at five different 
stadia by taking advantage of police-recorded crime and incident data for match days as 
well as a set of non-match comparison days. In the section that follows we provide 
further background on the history of football and crime, the criminological literature on 
stadia and other types of facilities, as well as the theoretical framework that guides the 
analyses that follow. Next, we provide details about the data, the analytic strategy that is 
adopted, and report our findings. Finally, we discuss the implications of the results for: 
(1) policy as it relates to the level of financial contribution (if any) football clubs should 
make towards the costs of policing football matches; (2) the allocation of police resources 
on match days for prevention and detection; and (3) for theories of environmental 
criminology.  
 
 
Football, Facilities and a Theoretical Framework 
 
Crime and football have long been bedfellows. Football-related disorder dates back to the 
Middle Ages when a folk version of the game was played in the UK  (Elias and Dunning, 
1971). Shortly after the Football Association was formed and the game was officially 
codified in 1863, organised professional football began to flourish and with it came stadia 
and supporters. Since these early days, police have frequently claimed that matches 
significantly increase crime levels in the area surrounding football grounds. In addition, a 
number of ecologically based approaches to studying crime (that focus on their pattern in 
time and space) suggest that facilities, such as football stadia, will often produce an 
increase in the number of offences in and around their grounds (Cohn and Breetzke, 
2013; Kurland et al, 2014). For example, studying other types of facilities that affect the 
ambient population in their vicinity, Roncek and Lobosco (1983) report that high schools 
draw in large numbers of people. Moreover, these often include offenders who take 
advantage of serendipitous opportunities thereby leading to an increase in the number of 
offences that take place. Block and Block (2000) report similar results around train 
stations.  
According to the routine activity approach a crime occurs when, in the course of 
normal activities, a motivated offender and a suitable target converge in time and space in 
the absence of a capable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979). A professional football 
match is an archetypal example where these conditions for crime can be expected. Games 
result in increased populations (some of whose members may be motivated offenders, 
targets and others capable guardians) in a specific location under conditions that are 
conducive to certain types of crime. Those conditions include, for example, increased 
anonymity for would be offenders in crowds and also a ready supply of suitable victims 
who are distracted and hence more vulnerable. Thus, it seems reasonable to conjecture 
that the convergence of large numbers of people at football matches will produce added 
opportunities for crime, thereby increasing the numbers of crimes when matches are 
played.   
Crime pattern theory (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981), like the routine activity 
approach, focuses on patterns of crime. However, this theory is concerned specifically 
with spatial patterns of crime, and differs from the routine activity approach in focusing 
on how the necessary elements of crime come to converge in time and space. The theory 
posits that offenders are more likely to offend in areas with which they are familiar; these 
areas are usually those that they frequent whilst going about legitimate activities (e.g., 
pubs, railway stations) and/or are located along the pathways that connect such places. In 
the context of football matches, supporters must travel to the ground, and many fans will 
converge at locations outside of the stadium that are routinely visited on match days. 
These include nearby public houses, fast food restaurants, and the key transportation 
nodes used by supporters as they travel to and from the football grounds.  Activity at 
these locations provides additional opportunities for crime in the surrounding areas. This 
convergence is time-limited: people tend to arrive before a match begins and leave after it 
ends (or shortly before depending on the result). As such, if football matches do influence 
levels of crime, then we would expect various types of crime to increase during the hours 
leading up to matches, during the match and after its conclusion, but not at other times of 
the day or on days when football matches do not occur.  
In accordance with these two theories of environmental criminology, an increase in 
violent crime might be expected as a result of the increased density of people and the 
provocations caused by rival supporters’ interactions with each other (Rotten, et al, 1978; 
Branscombe and Wann, 1992, Gordon, 2004). At the same time, but with alternative 
precipitators, we would expect various forms of acquisitive crime, such as theft and 
handling, and criminal damage to increase because of a lack of supervision (Mustaine and 
Tewksbury, 1998; Engstad, 1975) and the increased stealth afforded by crowds. The 
increase in the prevalence of these types of crime event—where there is an expectation 
for more crime events on match days—will also likely result in a change in the temporal 
crime and incident patterns during these days.  More generally, recent research suggests 
that busy places offer criminal opportunity and so one expectation in the current study is 
that crime at and around football stadia should increase on match days (Wilcox and Eck, 
2011).  
Kurland et al (2014) tested this hypothesis by comparing counts of crime around 
Wembley National Stadium on match, and on equivalent non-match days. In that study, 
the non-match days selected for comparison purposes were selected so as to be as similar 
as possible to the match days. For example, if a match took place on a Saturday, for the 
purposes of comparison the closest Saturday on which no football match occurred at 
Wembley stadium was selected as a comparator. Findings indicated that significantly 
more crimes occurred on match days up to 750 metres from the stadium than on relevant 
comparators.  This approach to analysis may provide a meaningful way for identifying 
the area over which football clubs should be held responsible for the costs associated with 
policing matches.  At present, the typical area for which clubs are held responsible 
includes the stadium itself and the immediate vicinity around the ground, to a distance of 
approximately 100 metres. If the findings of the earlier study are generalisable, this 
would suggest that the impact of football matches extends over a greater range than that 
for which clubs are currently expected to pay. Our first hypothesis thus focuses on this 
issue and can be summarised as follows: differences in the spatial pattern (and count) of 
incidents of crime and disorder are expected on match and non-match days, with more 
events expected on the former than the latter.   
 
Analyses are also conducted to examine the distance over which differences exist both 
for crime in the aggregate and for specific types of crime (violence against the person, 
theft and handling, criminal damage; and other forms of crime).  To compliment the 
spatial analyses, we examine whether the timing of crime events differs for match and 
non-match days, as expected. With respect to the policy issue discussed above this is 
important, as presently, clubs pay for the three hours prior to match kick off and the two 
hours after and it is unclear as to whether this is a sufficient period of time. Hypothesis 2 
thus concerns the timing of events and can be expressed as follows: differences in the 
timing of incidents of crime and disorder are expected on match compared to non-match 
days, with more events expected before and after matches on match than non-match days.  
Again, analyses are conducted for all crimes considered and for particular types of crime 
to examine whether the patterns are consistent across offence types. 
 
In the next section we summarise the data employed and the approach to analysis before 
presenting our findings.  The findings are then discussed with respect to their 
implications for criminological theory and policy. 
 
Data and Methods  
 
This study used geocoded crime and incident data provided by the West Midlands Police, 
West Yorkshire Police, South Yorkshire Police, and British Transport Police for the five 
football clubs mentioned above. Crime and incident data are fundamentally different. 
Crime data clearly capture only crimes. Incident data, however, can be generated in a 
number of ways. They include, but are not limited to, emergency calls (or calls for 
service) about crimes in progress or concerns about disorder, not all of which lead to 
arrests. The data provided included 51,681 crimes and 159,363 incidents. A breakdown 
of these crimes and incidents by club is shown in Table 1. Building on previous work  
(Kurland et al, 2010), data were assembled for events that occurred within a three-
kilometre radius around each club for a six-year timeframe (2005 - 2010).  This provides 
for a consistent estimation of how spatial and temporal patterns of crime and incidents 
differ on match and non-match days. 
 
Table 1 here 
  
 Prior to analysis, the days on which matches took place at the selected stadia were 
identified. A Java-based program was then used to identify relevant comparison days to 
set against those on which matches were played. The methods used to select the sample 
of non-match days were designed to reduce the likelihood that confounding variables, 
such as seasonality (Hird and Ruparal, 2007) or day of the week (Boba, 2009), would 
invalidate any estimate of the effect that football matches may have on spatiotemporal 
patterns of crime. The program identifies the seven days before and the seven days after a 
given match selecting one optimal comparator date in each week. If no match occurs on 
either date, and if neither has already been selected as the comparison day for another 
match, the earlier date is selected as the comparator to leave sufficient comparison days 
for matches occurring at a later date. However, if both dates are unavailable due to the 
occurrence of a match, or because they have been previously selected as a comparator, 
then the program search parameters are expanded to fourteen days before and after the 
match or event, and if still no suitable comparator is identified then the parameters are 
expanded to twenty-one days and then to twenty-eight days.  There was a spatial overlap 
between Sheffield United’s and Sheffield Wednesday’s study areas and because of this an 
additional parameter that accounted for the match schedule for an additional club was 
used for these two clubs. This method helped to rule out the possibility of selecting a 
comparison day when there was in fact a match at one stadium but not the other.  All 
other aspects of non-match comparison day selection followed the same search criteria. 
Using this program, comparator days were identified for 90 per cent of all matches and 
over 70 per cent of those identified as optimal comparator days were within seven days of 
the match day (see Table 2). Those matches where no comparison date could be 
identified within the twenty-eight day timeframe were excluded from the analyses. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Next, all crimes and incidents that took place on the identified days for the study 
areas were classified in two ways. First, crimes were identified by type according to 
Home Office classification codes and then placed into six separate categories: total 
incidents, total crime, theft and handling, violence against the person, criminal damage 
and an amalgamated ‘other’ category that was made up of all other Home Office 
offences, such as robbery, burglary, sexual offences, drugs, fraud and forgery and other 
notifiable offences. Although variations in recording practices can be problematic with 
police-recorded data, particularly when comparing areas in different forces, the 
introduction in April 2002 of the National Crime Recording Standard minimises such 
problems (Simmons et al, 2003). Moreover, any such variation would not affect the 
results for each club. 
Secondly, all geocoded crimes and incidents were aggregated to spatial zones by type 
of day and stadium considered using the formula for Euclidean distance, as per Eq. 1. 
 
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘 = √(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 − 𝑥𝑘)2 + (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 − 𝑦𝑘)2                                   (1) 
where, 𝑖 refers to the crime considered, 𝑗 refers to the type of day considered  (match or 
comparison day), 𝑘 refers to the stadium considered, 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 (𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘) refers to the x (y)-
coordinate for the crime 𝑖 for type of day  𝑗 at stadium 𝑘. 
To facilitate comparisons across stadia, crimes and incidents were assigned to 
concentric geographic zones according to the distance from the stadium at which they 
occurred. Different radii could be used to define the geographic zones. Here we use 
increments of 250m.  To take an example, any crime that occurred within 250 metres of a 
stadium was assigned to the innermost zone (0-250m).  Those crimes and incidents that 
took place between 250 and 500 metres were assigned to the second zone, and so on 
through successive 250 metre increments up to three kilometres from the stadium centre. 
See Fig. 1 for an example of synthetic match and comparison day crime data that 
illustrates the method.  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The assignment of crimes and incidents to zones resulted in 12 groups of crime 
counts that were classified by their distance from the stadium for each type of day (match 
vs. non-match). Table 3 provides the count for both sets of days for each respective 
stadium across each of the 12, 250 metre zones.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
Allocating crimes to discrete zones also made it possible to calculate the spatial 
extent of the differences in crime patterns between match and non-match days.  For 
example, the counts of crime from just zone one for match days could be compared 
against the same zone for non-match days. This could also be scaled up to compare larger 
areas around the stadia. For example, it was also possible to test the one kilometre area 
around the ground by comparing the sum of the crime counts in zones one to four on 
match days with the sum of the crimes in the same zones on comparison days. Non-
parametric permutation tests were used to examine whether the counts of crimes within 
these radiating zones were, in statistical terms, significantly higher on match than non-
match days.  
Permutation tests are used to compute the probability with which a particular outcome 
would be observed, assuming the null hypothesis—in this case, that there were no 
differences between match and non-match days—were true.  Permutation tests are 
preferred because they are non-parametric and hence require satisfaction of fewer 
assumptions about the data to be analysed (e.g. that the data are normally distributed) 
than their parametric counterparts.  
To conduct the analysis, for a given test statistic, the expected distribution is derived 
by enumerating all—or a large sample of—values of the test statistic derived under the 
null hypothesis.  In this case, the null hypothesis is that there is no difference between 
match and comparison day crime counts.  Thus, if the null hypothesis is true, any 
differences observed between the two samples should be similar to those obtained if we 
were to randomly shuffle the crime counts between the two sets of days (i.e. this would 
simulate the expected outcome if there were no systematic difference across the two sets 
of days).  One shuffle of the data represents one realization of the null hypothesis, and a 
full permutation of all possible combinations produces a distribution for the test statistic. 
A full permutation is often too computationally intensive (or unnecessary) and so a 
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is commonly used to sample from all possible 
permutations.  Having derived an expected distribution for the test statistic (assuming the 
null hypothesis), it is easy to compute the probability of observing a value at least as 
large as that actually observed if the null hypothesis were true (see Good, 2000; North et 
al, 2002) by computing where, in a rank-ordered list of the values for the expected 
distribution, the observed value falls (See Eq. 2).  
 
𝑝 =
𝑟 + 1
𝑛 + 1
                                                                               (2) 
 
where, 𝑟 is the number of values for the permuted data that are at least as large as the 
observed value, and 𝑛 is the number of permutations used (in this case 999).  
 The permutation test was implemented in two ways. First, the expected difference 
for the total count of crimes between match and non-match days was estimated to 
compute the probability that the difference observed could have occurred on a chance 
basis.  More specifically, for each pairwise comparison (e.g. match days versus non-
match days), the sum of the differences in the counts of offences for the all match and 
comparison days for each respective zone is calculated, as per Eq. (3) 
 
𝐷𝑗 = ∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
− 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗                                        (3) 
 
where, 𝑖 refers to the crime type and 𝑗 refers to the zone the crime occurred in. 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗 
refers to the count for crime type 𝑖 in zone 𝑗 for all match days. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 refers to 
the count for crime type 𝑖 in zone 𝑗 for all comparison days. 
One assumption of the above approach is that the difference in the total observed 
crime counts for match and non-match days is roughly equivalent, and hence that what is 
observed in the aggregate will generally apply for each pair of match-to-non-match day 
comparisons.  This may or may not be a reasonable assumption.  In the extreme, it is 
possible that for a single match-to-non-match comparison there may be a huge difference 
in the crime event counts for the match day and its associated non-match comparison day 
(e.g. 200 vs 10 events).  For the approach so far described, events are (uniformly) 
randomly allocated to match and non-match days and hence the combination described is 
unlikely to emerge on a chance basis.  For this reason, a variation of the above test was 
used that was based on different assumptions. For each match-to-non-match comparison 
the difference in the observed counts in each respective zone was again 
calculated.  However, this was then compared with what would be expected if the 
observed daily counts per zone were preserved but the type of day on which they 
occurred (match versus non-match) was random.  
To examine this, for each pairwise comparison (e.g. match days versus non match 
days), the sum of the differences in the counts of offences for each match day and 
comparison day is calculated, as per Eq. (4) 
 
𝐷𝑗 = ∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑁
𝑖=1
− 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑘                                       (4) 
 
where, 𝑖 refers to the crime type, 𝑗 refers to the zone the crime occurred in, and 𝑘 refers to 
the match day considered. 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘  refers to the count for crime type 𝑖  in zone 𝑗  on 
match day 𝑘. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑘 refers to the count for crime type 𝑖 in zone 𝑗 on comparison 
day 𝑘. 
     Next, the expected distribution of 𝐷𝑗 , assuming the null hypothesis is true is 
computed.  One permutation of the data can be produced using a uniform random number 
generator (𝑢𝑅𝑁𝐺) and the following approach: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑒 = {
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑒  𝑖𝑓  𝑢𝑅𝑁𝐺 < 0.5                                    
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑒  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                     (5)  
 
 
 
where,  𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑒 refers to the expected count of crime type 𝑖 in zone 𝑗 on match day 𝑘 
for permutation 𝑒. 
Where the value of the match count is swapped with that for the comparison day, the 
count for the comparison day is likewise switched for that of the match day.  Completing 
this exercise for each match-comparison day pairing provides one permutation of the data 
that may be used to compute one value of the expected distribution of 𝐷𝑗 .  This procedure 
was repeated 999 times and Eq. 2 was used again to determine the statistical significance 
of the observed 𝐷𝑗 .  
The two approaches answer different questions.  The first answers the question ‘in 
total were there more crimes on match days than non-match days’. The second concerns 
the question ‘in general, is it the case that more crimes consistently occur on match days 
than on comparable non-match days’.  By using both approaches the results are 
triangulated. This approach to testing data allows consistencies across models to be 
identified and leads to greater confidence in the meaning and precision of the findings.  
Because the results for both types of analysis are generally consistent, for simplicity we 
report only those results for the second test.  A complete set of results is available upon 
request.  
In addition to estimating the probability that the observed difference in daily crime 
counts was due to chance, it is also possible to examine precisely when (during the day) 
differences were observed. To facilitate comparisons across stadia, crimes and incidents 
were assigned to discrete time periods according to when they occurred. Different 
temporal intervals could be used. Here we use six four-hour intervals: Midnight to 3am, 
4am to 7am, 8am to 11am, noon to 4pm, 5pm to 8pm and 9pm to midnight. Moreover, to 
avoid dilution effects, the analyses focus on events that occurred within the geographical 
areas within which differences were observed.  Table 4 provides the counts of crime and 
disorder for each respective stadium for both types of day. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
 As before, non-parametric permutation tests were used to estimate the probability of 
seeing a difference equal to or greater than that observed for the two types of day and for 
the six four-hour intervals considered.   
 
Results  
 
Spatial Patterns 
 
In this section, we consider if and how the location of offences differed on match and 
non-match days.  We focus on changes in the 3km areas around the stadia to determine 
the distance over which differences in the counts of crime can be reasonably attributed to 
activity at the stadia.  
 
As shown in Figure 2, which includes the aggregate count for all match (and 
comparison) days and the mean count per match (and comparison) day, for four of the 
five clubs included in the study, results suggest a significant increase in match day counts 
of offences and incidents around the stadia.  Considering crime in the aggregate, 
significantly elevated counts of incidents of crime were observed up to around 1km from 
the stadia for Aston Villa, Leeds United, and Sheffield Wednesday (ps<0.001). For 
example, across all match days considered, 1,079 crimes (mean 13.58 per match) 
occurred up to 1 km from Leeds United on match days compared to a total 485 (mean 
10.24) on the non-match equivalents. For incidents, there were increased counts for all 
clubs; however there was considerable variation with respect to the spatial extent of this 
elevation in crime count. For Wolverhampton, the increase was observed over only a 
very limited distance (250m) from the ground (p<0.001). For all other clubs there were 
elevated counts of incidents up to at least 500m from their respective stadium centre 
(ps<0.05). This “spillover” is in line with the theories of environmental criminology 
discussed in the introduction, whereby an increased number of people in areas around 
stadia on match days is anticipated to provide more opportunities for crime. 
 
Considering specific crime types, elevated counts of violent crimes were observed for 
Aston Villa, Leeds United, Sheffield United, and Sheffield Wednesday, though the 
spatial extent varied between 250m and 1km (ps<0.01).  For all clubs, relative to 
comparison days, there appeared to be elevated counts of theft and handling on match 
days, with increases at Aston Villa and Leeds United extending up to nearly 2km from 
the ground (ps<0.01). 
 
For criminal damage, the analysis revealed elevated counts of offences at Aston Villa, 
Leeds United, Sheffield United, and Sheffield Wednesday.  For two study areas (Aston 
Villa and Sheffield Wednesday), the increase on match days appeared to extend to up to 
2km beyond the confines of the stadia (ps<0.01). Finally, Aston Villa, Leeds United and 
Sheffield Wednesday had elevated numbers of crimes in the amalgamated category 
‘other,’ with an increase in the stadium and immediately outside the stadium for Leeds 
United (p<0.001) as well elevated counts in areas 500m and 1km from the grounds at 
Aston Villa and Sheffield Wednesday respectively (ps<0.01).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Temporal Patterns 
 
In this section, we consider if and how the timing of offences differed on match and non-
match days.  We focus on changes in those areas around the stadia for which differences 
in the count of crime were reliably observed in the preceding analyses, since it is in these 
areas that changes in the timing of offences might reasonably be attributed to activity at 
the stadia. For example, for Aston Villa, changes in the temporal profile of offences were 
examined for up to the 1km from the centre of the stadium.  In the case of criminal 
damage, the analysis was extended to include offences that occurred up to 2.5km from 
the centre of the stadium, as it was over this distance that differences were observed for 
this type of offence (see Figure 2).  
 
To test whether there were statistically significant differences in the timing of 
offences on match and non-match days, a MC permutation test (described above) was 
used to compare hourly counts of crime for the two types of days.  Results for all five 
clubs included in the study suggest a significantly greater number of incidents on match 
days as well as a higher average number of incidents. Figure 3, which includes aggregate 
counts for both sets of days as well as daily averages, indicates that for both incidents and 
crime, significant differences were commonly observed during the daytime, which is 
when matches are typically scheduled in the UK. More specifically, roughly 61 per cent 
of all match start times occur during the period between noon and 3pm, 35 per cent occur 
between 4pm and 7pm, and 4 per cent take place between 8pm and midnight. To capture 
the club specific distribution of match kick offs, the total count and percentage of 
matches that occurred for each temporal period are included along the top of Figure 3.  
 
In the case of incidents (calls for service), the results are striking, with a greater 
number of incidents at all clubs for the period between noon and 7pm (all ps <0.01).  
With the exception of Aston Villa, significant increases were also observed for the period 
8am to noon at all clubs (all ps<0.01), which is the period immediately before many 
matches are typically scheduled to commence.  Significant increases were also observed 
between 8pm and midnight at three clubs (Leeds United, Sheffield Wednesday and 
Wolverhampton), between midnight and 3am at Sheffield Wednesday’s ground, and at 
two clubs (Leeds United and Wolverhampton) there were more incidents than usual 
between 4am and 8am. 
 
Considering crime in the aggregate, with the exception of Wolverhampton, a 
significantly greater number of events occurred at all clubs for the period between noon 
and midnight (all ps<0.001).  Significant increases in the number of violent offences 
occurred at Aston Villa and Leeds United between noon and midnight (ps<0.01) with the 
latter also experiencing a significant increase between midnight and 3am (p<0.05). 
Significant increases in violent offences were also observed at Sheffield Wednesday 
between 4pm and midnight. 
 
There were some variations in differences in the timing of theft and handling offences 
(ps<0.05) at Aston Villa, Leeds United, Sheffield United, and Sheffield Wednesday. 
However, increases tended to occur between noon and 7pm - the period when nearly all 
scheduled football matches take place. An increased number of criminal damage offences 
(ps<0.01) occurred at both Aston Villa and Leeds United between noon and 3pm as well 
as between 8pm and midnight. Finally, Aston Villa, Leeds United, and Sheffield 
Wednesday all had significantly elevated counts (ps<0.05) of crimes in the amalgamated 
category ‘other,’ with an increase between noon and midnight.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Informed by theories of environmental criminology, the aim of this study was to examine 
if and how the occurrence of crime and disorder are affected by activity at football stadia 
on match days.  Relative to similar non-match days, the results suggest that crime and 
disorder do increase at and around most clubs, and that such changes are observed for 
most of the offence types considered here.  Rather than being limited to the immediate 
vicinity of the football grounds, it is also clear that problems spill over to areas up to a 
distance of 2.5km away. This effect exceeds what would be expected on the basis of 
chance and was observed in all study locations for disorder and in four of the five study 
locations for crime. The results also show that these elevated counts of crimes 
consistently occur during the few hours leading up to matches, during matches and 
following their conclusion.  They are also observed at other times of the day but not so 
consistently. Such findings provide more solid evidence (rather than anecdote) for use by 
either clubs or police services in making their cases as to the level of financial 
contribution football clubs should make towards the costs of policing football matches, 
assuming that it is right that they be asked to make any contribution.  
This research has also shown how evidence can be collected and analysed to work out 
where and when supplementary policing is most needed, possibly enabling savings in 
overall costs to be made. The methodology provides a robust evidence-based approach to 
estimating the effects observed at individual football grounds that may help direct efforts 
at the prevention and detection of crime.  
The methodology used in this study could be adopted in relation to other facilities that 
may generate crime, where there may be court proceedings over who should bear the 
costs of any supplementary policing that may be required. Major entertainment events 
and non-football sports occasions in large venues, for example, could be subjected to 
similar analyses.  The possibility of litigation over payment for policing these, as well as 
football matches, highlights the potential for and importance of court access to 
systematic, empirical evidence.  
 
The findings also provide further support for theories of environmental criminology, 
such as routine activity and crime pattern theory.  These predict an increased risk of 
crime before, during, and after matches since it is during these periods that there will be a 
growth in the ambient population in and around football stadia. A number of potential 
contributors to these crime patterns are worth considering. For example, the elevated 
number of offences may be a function of extended hours of alcohol consumption and/or 
of the darkness (Tompson and Bowers, 2013) associated with later match kick offs, 
which provides greater anonymity to offenders. But, almost certainly the raised crime 
levels on match days reflect the larger number of potential opportunities that become 
available when supporters flood areas around the grounds.  
There are some possible rival explanations that may account for differences in match 
versus non-match comparison day crime counts, which cannot conclusively be ruled out 
and should be considered in future research. For instance, one possible reason for larger 
crime counts on match days might be the additional police officers deployed in and 
around stadia, whose attention is drawn to incidents of crime and disorder. This could go 
some way to explaining what is recorded inside stadia and directly outside them. 
However, this is unlikely to explain the differences observed at distances beyond those 
where additional policing resources are allocated on match days.  Another possibility 
could be that those who attend football matches are more likely to commit offences. 
Credence for this potential explanation can be found in studies of football hooliganism 
that have frequently identified consistency between the socio-demographic profile of 
those who attend matches and the profile of those most likely to be involved in violent 
crime more generally in the UK (Taylor 1976; Clarke 1978; Marsh 1988; Dunning 
Maguire, Murphy, and Williams 1982; Guilianotti 1994). That is, they are relatively 
young white men with working class backgrounds (Frosdick and Marsh 2005). This may 
offer a partial explanation for increases in violent crime, but the literature on hooliganism 
offers little insight beyond these simple demographic factors that would help explain 
increases in acquisitive crime such as theft and handling and criminal damage.  
Lastly, the findings suggest that the current method of charging football clubs in the 
UK based on the geographic extent of their property does not fully account for the true 
impact of football on crime in the area around these grounds.  Indeed, the current findings 
provide empirical evidence that football matches significantly increase crime and 
disorder in areas that extend beyond the roughly 100m radius for which football clubs 
currently subsidize the police.  Further research would be needed to determine if such 
results apply to all stadia, but given the diversity of the grounds considered, the current 
study goes some way towards establishing the external validity of the findings presented.  
This complements the anecdotal evidence previously presented in court, which has 
proven insufficient. Thus, such scientific methods may assist jurors and judges by 
providing unbiased estimates of the effect that football matches have on the 
neighbourhoods they are nested within to help to more fairly compensate match day 
policing services.  
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Table 1: Crimes and incidents within a three-kilometre radius at each club over six years 
Football Club Crimes Incidents 
Aston Villa 8,279 33,960 
Leeds 15,653 38,226 
Sheffield Utd 12,399 39,415 
Sheffield Wed 5,775 20,294 
Wolverhampton 9,575 27,468 
Total 51,681 159,363 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of match and non-match day samples 
Football Clubs 
Total Match 
Days 
7 Day 14 Day 21 Day 28 Day 
Total 
Comparison Day 
Aston Villa 116 77 14 8 5 104 
Leeds  138 125 10 3 0 138 
Sheffield Utd 127 65 12 10 14 101 
Sheffield Wed 126 63 14 13 8 98 
Wolverhampton 124 122 2 0 0 124 
Total 631 452 52 34 27 565 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Total match and comparison day () incident, crime, and crime category counts for each respective zone and study area 
 Club 0-250 251-500 501-750 751-1000 1000-1250 1250-1500 1500-1750 1750-2000 2000-2250 2250-2500 2500-1750 2750-3000 
In
ci
d
en
ts
 
Aston Villa 213 (83) 446 (360) 845 (730) 665 (659) 848 (729) 1304 (1237) 1443 (1440) 1712 (1751) 1684 (1732) 2040 (2062) 2178 (2282) 3559 (3688) 
Leeds 180 (60) 174 (138) 503 (469) 1018 (747) 1447 (1370) 1562 (1500) 1941 (1957) 1324 (1249) 1496 (1431) 3084 (2934) 2753 (2611) 4218 (4055) 
Sheffield Utd 411 (220) 861 (774) 1171 (1135) 1728 (1567) 2543 (2403) 2063 (1977) 2032 (1975) 1799 (1666) 1918 (1811) 2006 (1861) 1836 (1797) 2040 (1821) 
Sheffield Wed 261 (101) 343 (234) 394 (402) 770 (667) 927 (842) 898 (881) 891 (837) 1193 (1117) 985 (869) 856 (943) 1424 (1299) 1596 (1564) 
Wolverhampton 368 (178) 1292 (1208) 2384 (2281) 2616 (2501) 1542 (1571) 1520 (1605) 1667 (1678) 1417 (1391) 1313 (1357) 1588 (1582) 1416 (1446) 1717 (1800) 
C
ri
m
es
 
Aston Villa 129 (17) 181 (98) 276 (153) 194 (115) 228 (203) 333 (281) 451 (413) 423 (433) 444 (371) 467 (478) 522 (549) 716 (804) 
Leeds  364 (22) 86 (44) 272 (147) 357 (272) 491 (449) 586 (595) 672 (611) 410 (428) 545 (558) 951 (949) 1266 (1263) 2172 (2143) 
Sheffield Utd 236 (104) 268 (225) 504 (457) 662 (665) 935 (893) 751 (736) 554 (524) 435 (475) 552 (538) 439 (446) 444 (505) 528 (523) 
Sheffield Wed 96 (31) 121 (65) 120 (88) 294 (210) 327 (280) 320 (258) 212 (216) 313 (295) 271 (236) 223 (251) 337 (330) 463 (418) 
Wolverhampton 43 (33) 363 (340) 814 (763) 599 (548) 364 (392) 366 (411) 387 (349) 343 (318) 345 (302) 416 (410) 378 (342) 495 (439) 
V
io
le
n
ce
 
Aston Villa 68 (10) 50 (20) 53 (49) 54 (27) 38 (46) 86 (94) 100 (104) 121 (107) 106 (107) 129 (137) 146 (134) 205 (225) 
Leeds 232 (3) 29 (5) 35 (23) 69 (45) 91 (89) 113 (136) 121 (129) 70 (80) 62 (79) 148 (126) 250 (226) 326 (341) 
Sheffield Utd 90 (13) 33 (30) 124 (113) 136 (110) 265 (251) 106 (90) 89 (79) 79 (65) 75 (64) 79 (52) 60 (64) 66 (56) 
Sheffield Wed 37 (6) 24 (7) 20 (18) 74 (42) 52 (53) 57 (44) 48 (48) 47 (51) 52 (53) 32 (44) 77 (69) 72 (62) 
Wolverhampton 13 (10) 100 (86) 202 (203) 154 (121) 84 (80) 85 (93) 104 (79) 83 (72) 78 (59) 86 (80) 99 (78) 100 (92) 
T
h
ef
t 
Aston Villa 26 (2) 51 (29) 101 (32) 58 (28) 63 (42) 112 (63) 194 (154) 106 (126) 101 (91) 101 (123) 125 (129) 166 (196) 
Leeds 54 (6) 23 (10) 131 (53) 160 (80) 169 (134) 171 (119) 175 (145) 105 (116) 247 (251) 331 (366) 600 (636) 1237 (1178) 
Sheffield Utd 80 (44) 125 (95) 232 (199) 282 (250) 424 (393) 395 (394) 226 (207) 172 (184) 210 (204) 146 (156) 143 (167) 196 (205) 
Sheffield Wed 43 (12) 43 (22) 61 (35) 97 (89) 126 (100) 96 (93) 77 (80) 102 (94) 76 (69) 81 (64) 88 (95) 163 (166) 
Wolverhampton 17 (7) 119 (128) 366 (293) 217 (212) 98 (125) 90 (121) 92 (83) 83 (91) 85 (84) 109 (115) 95 (94) 141 (107) 
C
. 
D
am
ag
e 
Aston Villa 6 (2) 29 (23) 65 (28) 37 (27) 38 (36) 56 (43) 60 (45) 77  (68) 96 (54) 96 (69) 95 (92) 102 (124) 
Leeds 26 (7) 21 (10) 58 (32) 79 (63) 117 (114) 163 (190) 188 (151) 96 (108) 105 (98) 119 (112) 168 (152) 200 (225) 
Sheffield Utd 25 (12) 45 (24) 60 (59) 78 (86) 101 (93) 109(119) 96 (94) 93 (78) 149 (123) 119 (124) 123 (128) 136 (143) 
Sheffield Wed 5 (6) 20 (15) 21 (26) 67 (47) 95 (79) 102 (64) 56 (49) 93 (85) 78 (69) 66 (76) 92 (81) 136 (101) 
Wolverhampton 5 (5) 41 (32) 51 (32) 69 (67) 48 (58) 69 (76) 63 (61) 72 (68) 76 (68) 98 (69) 74 (62) 91 (104) 
O
th
er
 
Aston Villa 29 (3) 51 (26) 57 (44) 45 (33) 89 (79) 79 (81) 97 (110) 119 (132) 141 (119) 141 (149) 156 (194) 243 (259) 
Leeds  52 (6) 13 (19) 48 (39) 4 (84) 114 (112) 139 (150) 188 (186) 139 (124) 131 (130) 353 (345) 248 (249) 409 (399) 
Sheffield Utd 41(35) 65 (76) 88 (86) 166 (219) 145 (156) 141(133) 143 (144) 91 (148) 118 (147) 95 (114) 118 (146) 129 (119) 
Sheffield Wed 11 (6) 34 (21) 18 (9) 56 (32) 54 (48) 65 (57) 31 (39) 71 (65) 65 (45) 44 (67) 80 (85) 92 (89) 
Wolverhampton 8 (11) 103 (94) 195 (94) 159 (148) 134 (129) 122 (121) 128 (126) 105 (87) 106 (91) 123 (146) 110 (108) 163 (136) 
 
Table 4: Match and comparison day () incident, crime, and crime category counts for the significant area by period and study area 
 Club 0-3 4-7 8-11 12-15 16-19 20-23 
In
ci
d
en
ts
 
Aston Villa 129 (110) 95 (64) 163 (143) 314 (238) 426 (294) 318 (276) 
Leeds 179 (180) 125 (69) 309 (177) 315 (291) 466 (331) 481 (366) 
Sheffield Utd 141 (121) 98 (86) 134 (108) 260 (210) 341 (201) 298 (268) 
Sheffield Wed 69 (40) 22 (22) 93 (36) 103 (68) 178 (75) 139 (94) 
Wolverhampton 27 (31) 41 (21) 45 (15) 89 (44) 90 (44) 76 (36) 
C
ri
m
es
 
Aston Villa 59 (47) 20 (17) 46 (30) 171 (61) 244 (115) 220 (93) 
Leeds  68 (79) 28 (23) 46 (46) 259 (84) 340 (121) 338 (132) 
Sheffield Utd 44 (45) 21 (20) 32 (32) 101 (56) 161 (84) 145 (92) 
Sheffield Wed 168 (148) 44 (38) 78 (73) 255 (139) 326 (240) 407 (294) 
Wolverhampton - - - - - - 
V
io
le
n
ce
 
Aston Villa 10 (0) 1 (2) 1 (3) 16 (5) 55 (12) 35 (8) 
Leeds 11 (6) 4 (4)  10 (7) 98 (9) 118 (24) 124 (26) 
Sheffield Utd 3 (2) 2 (1) 3 (0) 17 (2) 39 (3) 26 (5) 
Sheffield Wed 3 (1) 2 (1) 3 (3) 9 (1) 27 (1) 17 (6) 
Wolverhampton - - - - - - 
T
h
ef
t 
Aston Villa 33 (35) 16 (12) 88 (36) 187 (91) 178 (99) 103 (77) 
Leeds 83 (81) 23 (22) 68 (69) 193 (80) 314 (135) 202 (160) 
Sheffield Utd 41 (42) 13 (13) 38 (47) 129 (77) 117 (78) 99 (81) 
Sheffield Wed 11 (7) 4 (4) 6 (5) 20 (15) 50 (18) 56 (21) 
Wolverhampton 1 (1) 0 (0) 2 (3) 4 (1) 10 (2) 0 (0) 
C
. 
D
am
ag
e 
Aston Villa 44 (48) 30 (25) 36 (35) 130 (76) 88 (83) 232 (128) 
Leeds 13 (17) 7 (8) 11 (9) 39 (14) 46 (31) 68 (33) 
Sheffield Utd 8 (5) 3 (4) 4 (3) 9 (6) 18 (10) 25 (8) 
Sheffield Wed 97 (85) 17 (17) 27 (27) 63 (34) 124 (107) 209 (170) 
Wolverhampton - - - - - - 
O
th
er
 
Aston Villa 9 (3) 4 (2) 4 (3) 16 (4) 24 (9) 23 (8) 
Leeds  0 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 14 (1) 25 (3) 13 (0) 
Sheffield Utd - - - - - - 
Sheffield Wed 14 (11) 5 (2) 3 (5) 31 (14) 40 (21) 26 (15) 
Wolverhampton - - - - - - 
 
